gtluke
08-06-2006, 04:39 AM
rene,
there was no secular violence because saddam was just murdering all the others. there was no chance for fighting because he was just killing them first.
we uncovered 200,000 bodies in a single mass grave.
we discovered 500 munitions of mass destruction. nerve gas, mustard gas.
that whole "bush lied" thing was proven wrong this summer when iraqi documentation proved that saddam DID in fact try to buy uranium from africa.
have you ever heard iraqi's complaining about we have done or what we are doing? if a single decent speaking iraqi came forward to the news about how they don't like us, CNN would blast it all day long for us. but you don't hear it. you know why? because they like us and they support and like what we are doing for them.
you want real news?
how about someone more experienced in iraqi news than cbs, abs, fox, or bbc
Amir Taheri, formerly the executive editor of Kayhan, Iran’s largest daily newspaper, is the author of ten books and a frequent contributor to numerous publications in the Middle East and Europe. His work appears regularly in the New York Post.
http://www.commentarymagazine.com/Produ ... i_0606.htm (http://www.commentarymagazine.com/Production/files/Taheri_0606.htm)
Amir Taheri
Spending time in the United States after a tour of Iraq can be a disorienting experience these days. Within hours of arriving here, as I can attest from a recent visit, one is confronted with an image of Iraq that is unrecognizable. It is created in several overlapping ways: through television footage showing the charred remains of vehicles used in suicide attacks, surrounded by wailing women in black and grim-looking men carrying coffins; by armchair strategists and political gurus predicting further doom or pontificating about how the war should have been fought in the first place; by authors of instant-history books making their rounds to dissect the various “fundamental mistakes” committed by the Bush administration; and by reporters, cocooned in hotels in Baghdad, explaining the “carnage” and “chaos” in the streets as signs of the country’s “impending” or “undeclared” civil war. Add to all this the day’s alleged scandal or revelation—an outed CIA operative, a reportedly doctored intelligence report, a leaked pessimistic assessment—and it is no wonder the American public registers disillusion with Iraq and everyone who embroiled the U.S. in its troubles.
It would be hard indeed for the average interested citizen to find out on his own just how grossly this image distorts the realities of present-day Iraq. Part of the problem, faced by even the most well-meaning news organizations, is the difficulty of covering so large and complex a subject; naturally, in such circumstances, sensational items rise to the top. But even ostensibly more objective efforts, like the Brookings Institution’s much-cited Iraq Index with its constantly updated array of security, economic, and public-opinion indicators, tell us little about the actual feel of the country on the ground.
To make matters worse, many of the newsmen, pundits, and commentators on whom American viewers and readers rely to describe the situation have been contaminated by the increasing bitterness of American politics. Clearly there are those in the media and the think tanks who wish the Iraq enterprise to end in tragedy, as a just comeuppance for George W. Bush. Others, prompted by noble sentiment, so abhor the idea of war that they would banish it from human discourse before admitting that, in some circumstances, military power can be used in support of a good cause. But whatever the reason, the half-truths and outright misinformation that now function as conventional wisdom have gravely disserved the American people.
For someone like myself who has spent considerable time in Iraq—a country I first visited in 1968—current reality there is, nevertheless, very different from this conventional wisdom, and so are the prospects for Iraq’s future. It helps to know where to look, what sources to trust, and how to evaluate the present moment against the background of Iraqi and Middle Eastern history.
Since my first encounter with Iraq almost 40 years ago, I have relied on several broad measures of social and economic health to assess the country’s condition. Through good times and bad, these signs have proved remarkably accurate—as accurate, that is, as is possible in human affairs. For some time now, all have been pointing in an unequivocally positive direction.
The first sign is refugees. When things have been truly desperate in Iraq—in 1959, 1969, 1971, 1973, 1980, 1988, and 1990—long queues of Iraqis have formed at the Turkish and Iranian frontiers, hoping to escape. In 1973, for example, when Saddam Hussein decided to expel all those whose ancestors had not been Ottoman citizens before Iraq’s creation as a state, some 1.2 million Iraqis left their homes in the space of just six weeks. This was not the temporary exile of a small group of middle-class professionals and intellectuals, which is a common enough phenomenon in most Arab countries. Rather, it was a departure en masse, affecting people both in small villages and in big cities, and it was a scene regularly repeated under Saddam Hussein.
Since the toppling of Saddam in 2003, this is one highly damaging image we have not seen on our television sets—and we can be sure that we would be seeing it if it were there to be shown. To the contrary, Iraqis, far from fleeing, have been returning home. By the end of 2005, in the most conservative estimate, the number of returnees topped the 1.2-million mark. Many of the camps set up for fleeing Iraqis in Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia since 1959 have now closed down. The oldest such center, at Ashrafiayh in southwest Iran, was formally shut when its last Iraqi guests returned home in 2004.
A second dependable sign likewise concerns human movement, but of a different kind. This is the flow of religious pilgrims to the Shiite shrines in Karbala and Najaf. Whenever things start to go badly in Iraq, this stream is reduced to a trickle and then it dries up completely. From 1991 (when Saddam Hussein massacred Shiites involved in a revolt against him) to 2003, there were scarcely any pilgrims to these cities. Since Saddam’s fall, they have been flooded with visitors. In 2005, the holy sites received an estimated 12 million pilgrims, making them the most visited spots in the entire Muslim world, ahead of both Mecca and Medina.
Over 3,000 Iraqi clerics have also returned from exile, and Shiite seminaries, which just a few years ago held no more than a few dozen pupils, now boast over 15,000 from 40 different countries. This is because Najaf, the oldest center of Shiite scholarship, is once again able to offer an alternative to Qom, the Iranian “holy city” where a radical and highly politicized version of Shiism is taught. Those wishing to pursue the study of more traditional and quietist forms of Shiism now go to Iraq where, unlike in Iran, the seminaries are not controlled by the government and its secret police.
A third sign, this one of the hard economic variety, is the value of the Iraqi dinar, especially as compared with the region’s other major currencies. In the final years of Saddam Hussein’s rule, the Iraqi dinar was in free fall; after 1995, it was no longer even traded in Iran and Kuwait. By contrast, the new dinar, introduced early in 2004, is doing well against both the Kuwaiti dinar and the Iranian rial, having risen by 17 percent against the former and by 23 percent against the latter. Although it is still impossible to fix its value against a basket of international currencies, the new Iraqi dinar has done well against the U.S. dollar, increasing in value by almost 18 percent between August 2004 and August 2005. The overwhelming majority of Iraqis, and millions of Iranians and Kuwaitis, now treat it as a safe and solid medium of exchange.
My fourth time-tested sign is the level of activity by small and medium-sized businesses. In the past, whenever things have gone downhill in Iraq, large numbers of such enterprises have simply closed down, with the country’s most capable entrepreneurs decamping to Jordan, Syria, Saudi Arabia, the Persian Gulf states, Turkey, Iran, and even Europe and North America. Since liberation, however, Iraq has witnessed a private-sector boom, especially among small and medium-sized businesses.
According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, as well as numerous private studies, the Iraqi economy has been doing better than any other in the region. The country’s gross domestic product rose to almost $90 billion in 2004 (the latest year for which figures are available), more than double the output for 2003, and its real growth rate, as estimated by the IMF, was 52.3 per cent. In that same period, exports increased by more than $3 billion, while the inflation rate fell to 25.4 percent, down from 70 percent in 2002. The unemployment rate was halved, from 60 percent to 30 percent.
Related to this is the level of agricultural activity. Between 1991 and 2003, the country’s farm sector experienced unprecedented decline, in the end leaving almost the entire nation dependent on rations distributed by the United Nations under Oil-for-Food. In the past two years, by contrast, Iraqi agriculture has undergone an equally unprecedented revival. Iraq now exports foodstuffs to neighboring countries, something that has not happened since the 1950’s. Much of the upturn is due to smallholders who, shaking off the collectivist system imposed by the Baathists, have retaken control of land that was confiscated decades ago by the state.
Finally, one of the surest indices of the health of Iraqi society has always been its readiness to talk to the outside world. Iraqis are a verbalizing people; when they fall silent, life is incontrovertibly becoming hard for them. There have been times, indeed, when one could find scarcely a single Iraqi, whether in Iraq or abroad, prepared to express an opinion on anything remotely political. This is what Kanan Makiya meant when he described Saddam Hussein’s regime as a “republic of fear.”
Today, again by way of dramatic contrast, Iraqis are voluble to a fault. Talk radio, television talk-shows, and Internet blogs are all the rage, while heated debate is the order of the day in shops, tea-houses, bazaars, mosques, offices, and private homes. A “catharsis” is how Luay Abdulilah, the Iraqi short-story writer and diarist, describes it. “This is one way of taking revenge against decades of deadly silence.” Moreover, a vast network of independent media has emerged in Iraq, including over 100 privately-owned newspapers and magazines and more than two dozen radio and television stations. To anyone familiar with the state of the media in the Arab world, it is a truism that Iraq today is the place where freedom of expression is most effectively exercised.
That an experienced observer of Iraq with a sense of history can point to so many positive factors in the country’s present condition will not do much, of course, to sway the more determined critics of the U.S. intervention there. They might even agree that the images fed to the American public show only part of the picture, and that the news from Iraq is not uniformly bad. But the root of their opposition runs deeper, to political fundamentals.
Their critique can be summarized in the aphorism that “democracy cannot be imposed by force.” It is a view that can be found among the more sophisticated elements on the Left and, increasingly, among dissenters on the Right, from Senator Chuck Hagel of Nebraska to the ex-neoconservative Francis Fukuyama. As Senator Hagel puts it, “You cannot in my opinion just impose a democratic form of government on a country with no history and no culture and no tradition of democracy.”
I would tend to agree. But is Iraq such a place? In point of fact, before the 1958 pro-Soviet military coup d’etat that established a leftist dictatorship, Iraq did have its modest but nevertheless significant share of democratic history, culture, and tradition. The country came into being through a popular referendum held in 1921. A constitutional monarchy modeled on the United Kingdom, it had a bicameral parliament, several political parties (including the Baath and the Communists), and periodic elections that led to changes of policy and government. At the time, Iraq also enjoyed the freest press in the Arab world, plus the widest space for debate and dissent in the Muslim Middle East.
To be sure, Baghdad in those days was no Westminster, and, as the 1958 coup proved, Iraqi democracy was fragile. But every serious student of contemporary Iraq knows that substantial segments of the population, from all ethnic and religious communities, had more than a taste of the modern world’s democratic aspirations. As evidence, one need only consult the immense literary and artistic production of Iraqis both before and after the 1958 coup. Under successor dictatorial regimes, it is true, the conviction took hold that democratic principles had no future in Iraq—a conviction that was responsible in large part for driving almost five million Iraqis, a quarter of the population, into exile between 1958 and 2003, just as the opposite conviction is attracting so many of them and their children back to Iraq today.
A related argument used to condemn Iraq’s democratic prospects is that it is an “artificial” country, one that can be held together only by a dictator. But did any nation-state fall from the heavens wholly made? All are to some extent artificial creations, and the U.S. is preeminently so. The truth is that Iraq—one of the 53 founding countries of the United Nations—is older than a majority of that organization’s current 198 member states. Within the Arab League, and setting aside Oman and Yemen, none of the 22 members is older. Two-thirds of the 122 countries regarded as democracies by Freedom House came into being after Iraq’s appearance on the map.
Critics of the democratic project in Iraq also claim that, because it is a multi-ethnic and multi-confessional state, the country is doomed to despotism, civil war, or disintegration. But the same could be said of virtually all Middle Eastern states, most of which are neither multi-ethnic nor multi-confessional. More important, all Iraqis, regardless of their ethnic, linguistic, and sectarian differences, share a sense of national identity—uruqa (“Iraqi-ness”)—that has developed over the past eight decades. A unified, federal state may still come to grief in Iraq—history is not written in advance—but even should a divorce become inevitable at some point, a democratic Iraq would be in a better position to manage it.
What all of this demonstrates is that, contrary to received opinion, Operation Iraqi Freedom was not an attempt to impose democracy by force. Rather, it was an effort to use force to remove impediments to democratization, primarily by deposing a tyrant who had utterly suppressed a well-established aspect of the country’s identity. It may take years before we know for certain whether or not post-liberation Iraq has definitely chosen democracy. But one thing is certain: without the use of force to remove the Baathist regime, the people of Iraq would not have had the opportunity even to contemplate a democratic future.
Assessing the progress of that democratic project is no simple matter. But, by any reasonable standard, Iraqis have made extraordinary strides. In a series of municipal polls and two general elections in the past three years, up to 70 percent of eligible Iraqis have voted. This new orientation is supported by more than 60 political parties and organizations, the first genuinely free-trade unions in the Arab world, a growing number of professional associations acting independently of the state, and more than 400 nongovernmental organizations representing diverse segments of civil society. A new constitution, written by Iraqis representing the full spectrum of political, ethnic, and religious sensibilities was overwhelmingly approved by the electorate in a referendum last October.
Iraq’s new democratic reality is also reflected in the vocabulary of politics used at every level of society. Many new words—accountability, transparency, pluralism, dissent—have entered political discourse in Iraq for the first time. More remarkably, perhaps, all parties and personalities currently engaged in the democratic process have committed themselves to the principle that power should be sought, won, and lost only through free and fair elections.
These democratic achievements are especially impressive when set side by side with the declared aims of the enemies of the new Iraq, who have put up a determined fight against it. Since the country’s liberation, the jihadists and residual Baathists have killed an estimated 23,000 Iraqis, mostly civilians, in scores of random attacks and suicide operations. Indirectly, they have caused the death of thousands more, by sabotaging water and electricity services and by provoking sectarian revenge attacks.
But they have failed to translate their talent for mayhem and murder into political success. Their campaign has not succeeded in appreciably slowing down, let alone stopping, the country’s democratization. Indeed, at each step along the way, the jihadists and Baathists have seen their self-declared objectives thwarted.
After the invasion, they tried at first to prevent the formation of a Governing Council, the expression of Iraq’s continued existence as a sovereign nation-state. They managed to murder several members of the council, including its president in 2003, but failed to prevent its formation or to keep it from performing its task in the interim period. The next aim of the insurgents was to stop municipal elections. Their message was simple: candidates and voters would be killed. But, once again, they failed: thousands of men and women came forward as candidates and more than 1.5 million Iraqis voted in the localities where elections were held.
The insurgency made similar threats in the lead-up to the first general election, and the result was the same. Despite killing 36 candidates and 148 voters, they failed to derail the balloting, in which the number of voters rose to more than 8 million. Nor could the insurgency prevent the writing of the new democratic constitution, despite a campaign of assassination against its drafters. The text was ready in time and was submitted to and approved by a referendum, exactly as planned. The number of voters rose yet again, to more than 9 million.
What of relations among the Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds—the focus of so much attention of late? For almost three years, the insurgency worked hard to keep the Arab Sunni community, which accounts for some 15 percent of the population, out of the political process. But that campaign collapsed when millions of Sunnis turned out to vote in the constitutional referendum and in the second general election, which saw almost 11 million Iraqis go to the polls. As I write, all political parties representing the Arab Sunni minority have joined the political process and have strong representation in the new parliament. With the convening of that parliament, and the nomination in April of a new prime minister and a three-man presidential council, the way is open for the formation of a broad-based government of national unity to lead Iraq over the next four years.
As for the insurgency’s effort to foment sectarian violence—a strategy first launched in earnest toward the end of 2005—this too has run aground. The hope here was to provoke a full-scale war between the Arab Sunni minority and the Arab Shiites who account for some 60 percent of the population. The new strategy, like the ones previously tried, has certainly produced many deaths. But despite countless cases of sectarian killings by so-called militias, there is still no sign that the Shiites as a whole will acquiesce in the role assigned them by the insurgency and organize a concerted campaign of nationwide retaliation.
Finally, despite the impression created by relentlessly dire reporting in the West, the insurgency has proved unable to shut down essential government services. Hundreds of teachers and schoolchildren have been killed in incidents including the beheading of two teachers in their classrooms this April and horrific suicide attacks against school buses. But by September 2004, most schools across Iraq and virtually all universities were open and functioning. By September 2005, more than 8.5 million Iraqi children and young people were attending school or university—an all-time record in the nation’s history.
A similar story applies to Iraq’s clinics and hospitals. Between October 2003 and January 2006, more than 80 medical doctors and over 400 nurses and medical auxiliaries were murdered by the insurgents. The jihadists also raided several hospitals, killing ordinary patients in their beds. But, once again, they failed in their objectives. By January 2006, all of Iraq’s 600 state-owned hospitals and clinics were in full operation, along with dozens of new ones set up by the private sector since liberation.
Another of the insurgency’s strategic goals was to bring the Iraqi oil industry to a halt and to disrupt the export of crude. Since July 2003, Iraq’s oil infrastructure has been the target of more than 3,000 attacks and attempts at sabotage. But once more the insurgency has failed to achieve its goals. Iraq has resumed its membership in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and has returned to world markets as a major oil exporter. According to projections, by the end of 2006 it will be producing its full OPEC quota of 2.8 million barrels a day.
The Baathist remnant and its jihadist allies resemble a gambler who wins a heap of chips at a roulette table only to discover that he cannot exchange them for real money at the front desk. The enemies of the new Iraq have succeeded in ruining the lives of tens of thousands of Iraqis, but over the past three years they have advanced their overarching goals, such as they are, very little. Instead, they have been militarily contained and politically defeated again and again, and the beneficiary has been Iraqi democracy.
None of this means that the new Iraq is out of the woods. Far from it. Democratic success still requires a great deal of patience, determination, and luck. The U.S.-led coalition, its allies, and partners have achieved most of their major political objectives, but that achievement remains under threat and could be endangered if the U.S., for whatever reason, should decide to snatch a defeat from the jaws of victory.
The current mandate of the U.S.-led coalition runs out at the end of this year, and it is unlikely that Washington and its allies will want to maintain their military presence at current levels. In the past few months, more than half of the 103 bases used by the coalition have been transferred to the new Iraqi army. The best guess is that the number of U.S. and coalition troops could be cut from 140,000 to 25,000 or 30,000 by the end of 2007.
One might wonder why, if the military mission has been so successful, the U.S. still needs to maintain a military presence in Iraq for at least another two years. There are three reasons for this.
The first is to discourage Iraq’s predatory neighbors, notably Iran and Syria, which might wish to pursue their own agendas against the new government in Baghdad. Iran has already revived some claims under the Treaties of Erzerum (1846), according to which Tehran would enjoy a droit de regard over Shiite shrines in Iraq. In Syria, some in that country’s ruling circles have invoked the possibility of annexing the area known as Jazirah, the so-called Sunni triangle, in the name of Arab unity. For its part, Turkey is making noises about the Treaty of Lausanne (1923), which gave it a claim to the oilfields of northern Iraq. All of these pretensions need to be rebuffed.
The second reason for extending America’s military presence is political. The U.S. is acting as an arbiter among Iraq’s various ethnic and religious communities and political factions. It is, in a sense, a traffic cop, giving Iraqis a green or red light when and if needed. It is important that the U.S. continue performing this role for the first year or two of the newly elected parliament and government.
Finally, the U.S. and its allies have a key role to play in training and testing Iraq’s new army and police. Impressive success has already been achieved in that field. Nevertheless, the new Iraqi army needs at least another year or two before it will have developed adequate logistical capacities and learned to organize and conduct operations involving its various branches.
But will the U.S. stay the course? Many are betting against it. The Baathists and jihadists, their prior efforts to derail Iraqi democracy having come to naught, have now pinned their hopes on creating enough chaos and death to persuade Washington of the futility of its endeavors. In this, they have the tacit support not only of local Arab and Muslim despots rightly fearful of the democratic genie but of all those in the West whose own incessant theme has been the certainty of American failure. Among Bush-haters in the U.S., just as among anti-Americans around the world, predictions of civil war in Iraq, of spreading regional hostilities, and of a revived global terrorism are not about to cease any time soon.
But more sober observers should understand the real balance sheet in Iraq. Democracy is succeeding. Moreover, thanks to its success in Iraq, there are stirrings elsewhere in the region. Beyond the much-publicized electoral concessions wrung from authoritarian rulers in Egypt and Saudi Arabia, there is a new democratic discourse to be heard. Nationalism and pan-Arabism, yesterday’s hollow rallying cries, have given way to a “big idea” of a very different kind. Debate and dissent are in the air where there was none before—a development owing, in significant measure, to the U.S. campaign in Iraq and the brilliant if still checkered Iraqi response.
The stakes, in short, could not be higher. This is all the more reason to celebrate, to build on, and to consolidate what has already been accomplished. Instead of railing against the Bush administration, America’s elites would do better, and incidentally display greater self-respect, to direct their wrath where it properly belongs: at those violent and unrestrained enemies of democracy in Iraq who are, in truth, the enemies of democracy in America as well, and of everything America has ever stood for.
Is Iraq a quagmire, a disaster, a failure? Certainly not; none of the above. Of all the adjectives used by skeptics and critics to describe today’s Iraq, the only one that has a ring of truth is “messy.” Yes, the situation in Iraq today is messy. Births always are. Since when is that a reason to declare a baby unworthy of life?
want some quick facts?
Taken from http://www.usaid.gov/iraq/accomplishments/
Electricity
EXPANDING ACCESS TO ELECTRICITY
In 2002, Baghdad had access to electricity 24 hours a day; the rest of Iraq was limited to 3-6 hours of electricity daily. Currently, all 18 governorates receive roughly 13 hours of electricity daily on average, an incredible improvement for a country emerging from decades of conflict and neglect. USAID programs have added over 1,200 MW of new or rehabilitated generation capacity to the national grid, increasing availability to over 4 million Iraqis. Access to electricity – powering hospitals, machinery, and homes – improves the lives of ordinary Iraqis and enables local business and industries to take succeed.
Restoring and improving Iraq’s electricity supply has been USAID’s biggest and most costly challenge. In April 2003, Iraq’s usable electrical generation capacity was 2,500 MW — 58 percent of the pre-conflict level. Before the conflict, access to power was unreliable and varied greatly throughout the country. USAID is restoring electricity to homes, public facilities, and business throughout Iraq.
USAID has helped increase electrical generation to an average daily peak of approximately 4,500 MW. However, estimated total demand in Iraq is 8,500 MW and the looting of cables, destruction of hightension towers, and sabotage of fuel lines persist. Decades of operation without regular maintenance have resulted in increased breakdown and a need for significant rehabilitation.
ACCOMPLISHMENTS
-Repaired thermal units, replaced/ added turbines, rehabilitated the transmission network, and installed and restored generators.
-Returned to pre-war daily generation levels of 3,958 MW by October 2003 and reached a peak of 4,584 MW during July 2004.
-USAID has added 1,086 MW of generation capacity through new generation, maintenance and rehabilitation work, and repaired the 400 KV Khor az Zubayr-Nasiriyah transmission line.
-USAID and partners are rehabilitating or constructing 25 distribution substations in Baghdad to improve the distribution and reliability of electricity for more than two million residents. Eight critical substations were energized early in anticipation of the summer peak.
-USAID has also begun an Operations and Maintenance Program (O&M) at the 19 generation sites throughout Iraq to improve the output and reliability.
NEXT STEPS
-USAID and partners will continue to improve power generation capacity and stability.
-Short term: Continue with maintenance and rehabilitation work to increase generation. By October 2006, USAID and the Ministry of Electricity will have added an additional 712 MW to the national grid for a total of 1500 MW increase in new or rehabilitated generation capacity.
-Longer term: Continue training Iraqi workers on plant O&M to ensure project sustainability.
Water and Sanitation
USAID has rehabilitated sewage treatment plants, expanding access to sewage treatment to over 4.4 million urban Iraqis, processing 339.7 million gallons daily. Over 4 million Iraqis who had no clean drinking water in 2002 now have safe, potable water piped to their homes following USAID efforts to refurbish and expand 19 water treatment plants in five cities. Providing clean water and efficient sewage treatment has greatly improved sanitation and contributed to a decrease in waterborne disease. USAID is also providing plant-level operations and maintenance (O&M) training at major water and wastewater plants nationwide to ensure that these plants remain functioning. By December of 2006, USAID and implementing partners will restore water treatment service to 8.1 million Iraqis, and sewerage treatment service to 8.8 million.
RESTORING ESSENTIAL SERVICES
In 2003, Iraq’s 140 major water treatment facilities were operating at about 35 percent of their design capacity (3 billion liters a day) due to inadequate maintenance, lack of plant operators, power shortages, and looting. USAID is helping improve the efficiency and reliability of existing treatment facilities, and is constructing several new facilities, especially in the south where water quality is particularly poor. Iraq has 13 major wastewater treatment facilities, operating at about a quarter of their design capacity. Baghdad’s three sewage plants, comprising three quarters of the nation’s total sewage treatment capacity, were not treating waste for more than six years before the conflict, allowing raw waste to flow into the Tigris River. In the rest of the country, most wastewater treatment facilities were only partly operational before the conflict, and a shortage of electricity, parts, and trained staff exacerbated the situation.
ACCOMPLISHMENTS
Nationwide:
-Restored water treatment to 4 million urban Iraqis and sewage treatment to 4.4 million.
Baghdad:
-Expanded Sharq Dijlah water plant by 50 MGD and rehabilitated three sewage plants, which serve 80 percent of Baghdad’s population, thus eliminating dumping raw sewage into the Tigris.
-Kerkh wastewater treatment plant (WTP) began operating on May 19, 2004, the first major Iraqi plant to operate at full capacity in more than 12 years.
-Standby generators have been procured and installed at 39 Baghdad water facilities, ensuring continued supply of treated water in the event of power outages.
South:
-Rehabilitated the Sweet Water Canal system: repairing breaches, cleaning and repairing the main water storage and settling reservoir and refurbishing 14 water treatment plants around Basrah city.
-Treated water production increased 100 percent, serving over 2 million people.
South Central:
-Rehabilitated one water plant and three sewage plants. Najaf, Diwaniyah, and Hillah sewage plants serve more than 350,000. Water treatment plant in Najaf serves residents and pilgrims at one of Iraq’s holiest shrines.
North:
-Provided major equipment for Mosul Water and Sewer Directorates.
-Refurbished the Kirkuk WTP.
NEXT STEPS
-Complete refurbishment and expansion project at Baghdad’s Sharkh Dijlah water plant.
-Complete construction of a water treatment plant in Baghdad’s Sadr City to ensure potable water for 2 million residents in one of the city’s poorest areas
-Implement a rural water project which will install potable water systems serving small rural communities of up to 5,000 people throughout Iraq.
-Complete two new sewer projects in Baghdad, which will improve sewage networks, relieving backed up sewage on the east side of the river.
-Continue to support O&M through onsite training and plant management, as well as direct purchasing of consumables such as alum, chlorine, and diesel fuel.
Airports
USAID’s Infrastructure Reconstruction program restored two of Iraq’s most important international airports. As conduits for humanitarian supplies, commercial goods, or personnel, the airports at Baghdad and Basrah serve as vital links both within Iraq and to the outside world. Since July 2003, Baghdad International Airport (BIAP) has processed over 5,000 flights. Currently, BIAP services over 60 civilian flights daily. Two airlines–AirServ and Royal Jordanian–operate daily international flights.
Two of Iraq’s three major airports assessed by USAID needed extensive rehabilitation, having suffered decades of neglect and weeks of looting. As part of the greater efforts to rebuild key infrastructure, USAID’s Infrastructure Reconstruction Phase I contract repaired and refurbished airports, seaports, roads, bridges, and railways throughout Iraq. Beginning in May 2003, emergency infrastructure work began to restore the Baghdad and Basrah airports, enabling both international airports to return to operations. Baghdad International Airport (BIAP) reopened as a commercial airport in July 2003.
USAID and implementing partners also initiated a substantial operations and management (O&M) training program, helping the airports meet international standards necessary to handle commercial traffic. Technical specialists conducted a large-scale training and equipping exercise to prepare Iraq staff to provide fire and rescue functions, training both on-the-job and at fire training facilities outside of Iraq. Staff also received training on security and equipment handling procedures. Training, system modernization, and some construction continued until February 2005.
ACCOMPLISHMENTS
Completed work preparing Al Basrah International Airport for commercial operations. Projects included:
-Rehabilitation of the airport’s wastewater and water treatment plants.
-Restoration of the runway, taxiway, and apron striping.
-Installation of two baggage x-ray units.
-Replacement of the perimeter security fence.
-Rehabilitation of control tower and building.
-Installation of toilets, passenger lounges, signs, and baggage carts.
-Installation of VSAT satellite and a radio communication system for airport administration.
Completed infrastructure work at Baghdad International Airport for civil air operations, including:
-Rehabilitation and modernization of the Air Traffic Control Tower
-Repair of Terminal C and administration offices.
-Construction of a security checkpoint and 240-car parking lot.
-Installation of VSAT communications systems and 6.5-megawatt power generators.
-Repair of perimeter security fence.
-Restoration of substation transformers and generators.
USAID partners also assessed the Mosul International Airport and found the facilities in good repair; resources were redirected to the rehabilitation of the Basrah and Baghdad airports.
Umm Qasr Seaport
Immediately following the spring 2003 conflict, USAID began work to refurbish and reopen the Port of Umm Qasr, Iraq’s primary commercial port that had become inoperable due to neglect. The USAID program both dredged the port and helped the Iraqi Port Authority build key capacity, providing extensive equipment and support. Two Iraqi dredgers, rehabilitated by USAID, will ensure continued maintenance.
The port reopened to commercial traffic mid-June 2004, servicing the first passenger vessel a month later. Since then, as many as 80 ships offload cargo at the port every month. Cargo volume continues to increase across a range of commodities, including cement, sugar, and wheat.
The Port of Umm Qasr, on Iraq's border with Kuwait, is the country's only deepwater ocean port. Although the facilities were not damaged during the conflict, they had not been maintained for several years and were extensively looted. Much of the port's infrastructure required repair, refurbishment, and in many situations substantial replacement and updating.
USAID removed silt, unexploded ordinance, and sunken ships left since the Iran-Iraq War. In coordination with the Iraqi Port Authority, USAID restored the port's capacity to process food and commercial shipments. Activities included establishing electrical power, repairing cargo handling equipment, and rehabilitating grain silos, the customs house, and administrative offices. The navigation channel and berths for deep-draft ships were dredged in coordination with the United Nations.
ACCOMPLISHMENTS
-All 21 berths were dredged for deep-draft ships; the entire port was dredged to an average depth of 12.5 meters. Two Iraqi dredgers, rehabilitated by USAID, perform ongoing maintenance dredging the harbor.
-Applied port tariffs on June 20, 2003, contributing to financial sustainability of port operations. Port revenues now outpace costs associated with handling cargo, and will help support capital repairs.
-The grain-receiving facility was renovated, allowing it to process up to 600 metric tons of grain an hour, thus unloading a standard grain freighter in 3 1/2 days. Maintenance and management of the grain-receiving facility have been handed over to the IZ Grain Board.
-Renovation of the administration building, passenger terminal, customs hall building, and near-by the electrical substations has been completed.
-Installed generators, energizing all three 11-kV ring mains for power distribution and restoring power to critical parts of the port.
Roads and Bridges
Iraq’s transportation networks are vital supports of Iraqi commerce, culture, and infrastructure. By 2004, USAID had rebuilt a series of crucial bridges, reconnecting Iraqi cities and provinces while reestablishing key commercial links to neighboring countries. A new railway connects Iraq’s only deep water port to a faster and more reliable distribution system, improving the movement of goods and equipment throughout the country while befitting local exporters.
ACCOMPLISHMENTS: BRIDGES
USAID completed 36 detailed assessments and demolished irreparable bridge sections in the rebuilding of three key bridges: the Al Mat Bridge, the Khazir Bridge, and the Tikrit Bridge.
-The Al Mat Bridge is a key link on the main highway between Baghdad and Jordan used by more than 3,000 trucks daily. Work was completed and the bridge was reopened to two-way traffic on March 3, 2004.
-The Khazir Bridge is critical to the flow of fuel and agricultural products in northern Iraq. The bridge’s four lanes were completed on May 1, 2004.
-The Tikrit Bridge is an important link for passengers and commerce over the Tigris River between Tikrit and Tuz Khurmatu. This two-lane bridge was reopened to traffic on September 15, 2004. In addition, USAID also repaired a floating bridge over the Tigris River at Al Kut, improving traffic for 50,000 travelers a day.
ACCOMPLISHMENTS: RAILROADS
-USAID’s partner completed an assessment of over 1,100 kilometers of railroad track and rail facilities throughout the country to identify priority projects. Proper rail construction and maintenance is vital in Iraq; rails can expand significantly during the heat of the day. If not done correctly, the rails will bow in the heat and cause trains to derail.
-USAID also assisted with the construction of 72 kilometers of new track and rail facilities between the Port of Umm Qasr and Shuaiba Junction, located west of Basrah, and connecting to the Baghdad trunklines. This project was a joint US-Iraqi effort; USAID constructed the civil facilities and provided project management and materials, and the Iraqi Republic Railways contributed project designs and materials, and supervised construction. Reconstruction of the line was completed in April 2004 and will increase the reliability of grain and other cargo shipments from Umm Qasr Port to storage silos and warehouses throughout the country.
Telecommunications
Since early 2003, telephone subscriptions in Iraq have increased almost four-fold, rising from 1.2 million land lines to 4.6 million land and cell lines. [Not mentioned: Internet access has also increased more than ten-fold.] USAID has worked extensively to restore and expand Iraq’s vital telecommunications network, connecting government agencies, businesses, and Iraqi citizens to each other throughout the country and to the outside world. In 2004, emergency repairs to the wired network reconnected 20 major cities and 70 percent of Iraqi subscribers. Key equipment was replaced and expanded. Iraqi engineers also received the training necessary to operate and maintain the equipment. Currently, USAID is helping the Ministry of Electricity consolidate communications, a move that will improve electrical service nation-wide.
RECONNECTING IRAQ
Prior to the conflict, 1.2 million Iraqis subscribed to landline telephone service and much of the telecommunication network was centralized in Baghdad. However, many of the network’s switches were damaged during the conflict and service was disrupted. In Baghdad, 12 telephone exchange switches (out of 38 total) serving 240,000 out of 540,000 telephone lines were out of service. These switches connect main telephone trunk lines to individual consumer lines.
As part of USAID’s effort to restore critical infrastructure and services, USAID’s partner worked with the Iraq Telecommunications and Postal Commission (ITPC) to restore the national fiber optic telecommunications network, repair the telephone switching system in Baghdad, and restore international telecommunications capability. USAID relied on ITPC personnel to perform much of the reconstruction activities and handed over operation and maintenance of all switch sites in mid-March 2004.
ACCOMPLISHMENTS
-Audited more than 1,200 km of the national fiber optic backbone network.
Performed emergency repairs to the national fiber optic network from Mosul to Umm Qasr, connecting 20 cities to Baghdad and the 70 percent of Iraqis that have landline telephone accounts.
-Purchased tools, equipment, and parts and provided management oversight to assist ITPC in the restoration of the fiber optic network.
-Replaced obsolete transmission equipment between Baghdad and Basrah in collaboration with the ITPC.
-Reconstituted Baghdad area phone service by installing switches with 240,000 lines at 12 sites.
-In total, USAID installed 12 domestic switches and one international switch, fully integrating the new equipment with the existing switches. The switches provide connection points for ITPC to connect subscribers.
-Installed a satellite gateway system and restored international calling service in December 2003.
-Trained ITPC engineers and technicians in the operation and maintenance of the satellite gateway system and the new telephone switches.
NEXT STEPS
In June 2005, USAID contractors began the installation of a $51.8 million consolidated fiber optic network which will connect electricity and communications sectors, allowing Ministry of Electricity officials to monitor and control the electrical grid from a central location. The network will also provide for inter-bank electronic transfers, and essential for commerce nationwide. This move, scheduled to finish in June 2006, will vastly improve the delivery of service to Iraqis throughout the country.
Operations and Maintenance
PROTECTING THE INVESTMENT
The Operations and Maintenance (O&M) initiative that accompanies the Iraq Infrastructure Reconstruction (IIR) program protects $2.6 billion invested since 2003 in Iraqi infrastructure. In Iraq, USAID pairs investment in equipment and infrastructure with investment in human resources to prevent new and improved equipment from being misused or destroyed through neglect. As the newly constructed or renovated systems and facilities are turned over to the Iraqis, the workers are given fundamental training in O&M, laying the groundwork for sustainable investments.
IIR has provided project-specific O&M training since the program began in 2003, teaching Iraqis the fundamental O&M for constructed facilities, equipment and systems.
TRAINING ACTIVITIES
USAID is implementing a power sector O&M program that consists of performing facility condition assessments, trainingincluding on-the-job training (OJT)- coaching, mentoring, providing maintenance and plant outage support, and furnishing test equipment, special tools, permanent plant equipment, materials, services and parts for use in support of the electrical generation facilities in Iraq.
As part of this project, USAID has provided approximately 60,000 hours of O&M technical and management training for 239 ME staff that were divided into tiers corresponding to their management level.
In the water and sanitation sector, USAID’s O&M program entails onsite O&M training and management as well as the direct purchase of consumables (e.g., chlorine and diesel fuel).
Although O&M training takes place on a particularly large scale for power, water, and sanitation plants, it also provides for a range of other facilities. Training has benefited airport firefighters receiving new fire equipment, stevedores and customs officials at Umm Qasr seaport, and workers at Baghdad International Airport.
O&M Training Tiers
Tier 1 - Five senior Ministry of Electricity staff members are taking executive management courses and leadership essentials courses at Georgia Tech
Tier 2 - 36 power plant senior managers are taking courses in electrical business development, leadership essentials, and advanced power plant management at Georgia Tech
Tier 3 - 83 power plant middle management members are taking courses in electrical business development, combustion power plant operations, thermal power plant operations, and ‘Train-the- Trainers’ instruction at the University of Jordan in Amman.
Tier 4 - 115 power plant operators and maintenance staff are taking courses in safety training, instrument calibration, plant system maintenance, optimum plant operations, distributive control systems, boiler chemistry, and water clarifier and filtration at the University of Jordan in Amman.
NEXT STEPS
The Capacity Development Working Group is designing an O&M program that will assist the GOI in establishing appropriate systems at the ministerial and plant level to adequately operate and maintain significant infrastructure. This program will, among other things,
-Strengthen key GOI counterparts through training and technical assistance in O&M best practices, budgeting, tariff development, metering, collections, capital expenditure forecasting, management, and supervisory training;
-Provide plant-level O&M training at major water, wastewater, and power plants nationwide with an emphasis on plants with prior USAID infrastructure investments;
-Develop national and regional training programs for technician- level skills and operator training; and
-Develop apprenticeship and certification programs.
Agriculture
Agriculture is Iraq’s largest employer, the second largest value sector, and an effective engine for promoting stability through private sector development, poverty reduction, and food security. The revival of a dynamic, market-driven agricultural sector will strengthen private business, increase income and employment opportunities, and meet the food requirements of the Iraqi people. Since 2003, USAID’s agriculture program has restored veterinary clinics, introduced improved cereal grain varieties, repaired agricultural equipment, and trained farmers and ministry staff.
-Food Security. Iraq currently imports almost $3 billion in food commodities annually. USAID programs are helping expand production of wheat, the most costly component of the Public Distribution System food basket, to minimize food imports. Already, efforts on select Iraqi farms have doubled wheat production, from 0.8 metric tons per hectare (MT/ha) to between 1.5 and 2.0 MT/ha. Over 360 crop demonstrations nationwide have introduced farmers to improved production technologies for wheat, barley, rice, and maize. In 2004 alone, the USAID program imported 4,000 tons of certified wheat seed, greatly improving crops on over 30,000 hectares.
-Private Sector Development. Decades of conflict and mismanagement have resulted in a severe lack of functioning agricultural machinery. USAID programs will repair 20 percent of Iraq’s tractor and combine harvester fleet by September 2006. The nationwide program will establish networks of trained technicians to support continued maintenance. Expanded wheat production from repaired equipment alone could easily reach an additional $36 million in revenue in the first year of this continuing program. USDA has also funded a U.S. Feed Grains Council private sector initiative to develop a private Iraqi credit facility for poultry producers for operational expenses and capital improvements.
-Poverty Reduction. Development and growth of the agricultural sector, currently employing 25 percent of the Iraqi workforce, will reduce poverty and improve household incomes. USAID supports the development of high value crops like date palms, tomatoes, and olives. In the south, USAID works with impoverished farmers to improve broad-bean production; in the north, vulnerable groups are participating in workshops on beekeeping, a traditionally profitable business. USAID-sponsored date palm nurseries across 13 governorates will produce 410,000 offshoots annually, eventually contributing $40 million to the Iraqi economy annually. Through Department of Defense funds, Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) commanders also support local agricultural projects such as livestock vaccinations.
-Livestock improvement programs benefit the poorest sectors of society. USAID is renovating 70 veterinary clinics and providing training across Iraq, benefiting over 180,000 breeders. Fertility treatments will increase water buffalo herds by 20 percent. USAID assisted farmers to expand domestic feed grain production to revitalize the domestic poultry industry, previously a major source of income.
-Irrigation. Over half the irrigated area in southern Iraq is affected by water-logging and salinity, diminishing crop production and farmer incomes. USAID and the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) are working to establish an integrated soil-water-crop management approach, including demonstrations illustrating efficient water use. USAID also assists Iraqi ministries in preparing a National Water Strategy to manage water allocation, storage capacity, hydro-dam reservoirs, and flood control.
NEXT STEPS
-Integrated Pest Management (IPM). USAID is currently working with the MoA to increasing wheat, maize, and rice production, and to expand cash crops such as dates, grapes, honey, and olives. Soil and Water Resources Management Program. In close collaboration with the Ministry of Water Resources and other ministries, USAID is developing a National Land and Water Resources Strategy Plan for improved water allocation, flood control, reservoir management, and water use efficiency.
Private Sector Development
Developing a vibrant private sector in Iraq is essential to the establishment of long-term economic growth, employment, and the creation of a nation of stakeholders. Complying with IMF commitments and ameliorating the economic effects of Saddam-era policies requires a sustained reform agenda. USAID supports this agenda through its Private Sector Development Program, “Izdihar” (“prosperity” in Arabic), coordinating with Iraqi government officials and business leaders on a range of activities to build a flourishing, market-driven economy to generate employment and sustainable economic growth.
Historically a society with a strong merchant class, Iraq’s private sector was devastated by decades of Ba’athist mismanagement, sanctions, and conflict. Since September 2004, the Private Sector Development Program has helped promote a market-based economy across six areas:
-Privatization. The majority of economic activity in Iraq is funneled through over 500 state-owned enterprises (SOEs), creating an unsupportable system. Through technical assistance and support, USAID is helping the Government of Iraq (GOI) privatize much of the economy, removing a major burden from the national budget and revitalizing the private sector.
-Trade and Market Access. Through sector studies and regulatory guidance, USAID is helping reconnect Iraq with the international market, allowing the country to benefit from management acumen, capital, and technology as well as goods and services.
-Investment Promotion. By promoting foreign investment and removing the barriers to private sectorled growth, USAID helps create a dynamic, market-driven economy that will generate employment.
-Capital Markets. USAID is helping the GOI reform the legal, regulatory, and structural elements of Iraq’s non-bank financial markets (e.g., insurance, pension, equity, and commercial debt). To date, USAID has worked with other U.S. government agencies to establish the Iraq Stock Exchange and Iraqi Securities Commission, essential to attracting foreign direct investment and privatizing SOEs.
-Business Skills. USAID support for accounting reform helps integrate Iraqi businesses into the global financial system. By December 2005, USAID will have delivered over 40,000 hours of training in international accounting standards, enabling businesses to secure loans and manage accounts.
-Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise. USAID is working with private banks and microfinance institutions to develop their lending capacity. The availability of loans is essential for private sector growth.
ACCOMPLISHMENTS
-Provided technical assistance for Coalition Provisional Authority’s $21 million micro-credit program.
-Evaluated and updated commercial laws on private sector and foreign investment.
-Drafted a privatization law and provided assistance to create a Privatization Committee that presented a privatization strategy to the High Economic Council in October 2005.
-Established the Iraq Investment Promotion Agency, a one-stop-shop for international investors.
-Developed an Investor Roadmap, analyzing investment constraints and outlining corrective policies.
-Developed a Competitiveness Strategy to help integrate efforts in revitalizing the private sector.
-Established a sustainable micro-finance grant program for small and medium size business seeking access to capital. To date, four micro-finance institutions, operating on the national level, have been selected to participate.
-Providing assistance to the Iraqi Ministry of Trade in developing business registry procedures for foreign and domestic companies seeking to register in Iraq. Since 2003, over 30,000 new businesses have been registered.
-Assisted the GOI in submitting the Memorandum on Foreign Trade Regime, the first step in joining the World Trade Organization (WTO), in May 2005. The accession process will oblige Iraq to reform its trade regulations and establish an open, market based economy.
NEXT STEPS
-Working to develop an Iraqi Loan Guarantee Corporation in February 2006 that will sell loan guarantees to private banks and microfinance institutions.
-Working with the military and the Iraqis to create and support regional micro-finance institutions (MFIs) throughout the country.
-Working towards revitalizing Iraq’s own high-stakes professional assessment exam—the Iraqi Certified Professional Accountant (CPA) exam.
Economic Governance
In July 2003, USAID began a program to build the capacity of the Iraqi Government to manage the transition from a command economy to that of one that is market-driven. USAID’s program helps the Iraqis develop policies, laws, and institutions that better regulate trade, commerce, and investment, and provide support to 10 government ministries and the Central Bank, key components of the Iraqi economy.
USAID programs are assisting Iraq’s Ministry of Finance (MoF), Central Organization for Statistics and Information Technology (COSIT), and Central Bank in meeting IMF requirements. These efforts are expected to return $480 million in the IMF Standby Agreement in December 2005 as well as debt forgiveness of $27 billion from the Paris Club by March 2006. Working with the MoF, USAID introduced the new dinar to promote national unity and promote a sound functioning monetary policy.
Building on the macroeconomic and fiscal reforms initiated under the first economic governance contract that ended in 2003, the Economic Governance II (EG II) program continues reforms necessary to help Iraq establish a policy-enabling environment that fosters private sector led growth. With its Iraqi partners, examples of USAID assistance efforts include developing legislation to implement key commercial, fiscal, institutional, and regulatory reforms; building the capacity of the Central Bank of Iraq; completing a banking sector reform assessment; enabling policy makers to formulate and implement decisions based on sound economic data; providing assistance in electricity and communications; and offering technical assistance for a government wide IT strategy. In addition to building capacity across the government, many of the reforms with which USAID is helping in the area of economic governance will help Iraq meet the conditions of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and, in turn, substantial sovereign debt relief from the Paris Club and others.
ACCOMPLISHMENTS
-Developed a government-wide strategy to support the automation of budget planning and reporting across ministries, including the creation of a Financial Management Information System (FMIS), a new accounting and reporting system for all ministries.
-Worked with the MoF to introduce the new Iraqi dinar. An estimated 4.62 trillion new dinar are now circulating in Iraq.
-Provided technical assistance on accounting, budgeting, and lending activities at Iraq’s commercial banks and improved statistical analysis, monetary policymaking, and bank supervision procedures at Iraq’s Central Bank.
-Evaluated and updated commercial laws on private sector and foreign investment.
-Assisted in developing sources of non-oil revenue in the country, including the continuation of the reconstruction levy and development of a mobile phone tax.
-Worked with the MoF to trained over 700 Iraqis in International Accounting Standards.
-Improved statistical analysis, monetary policymaking, and bank supervision procedures at Iraq’s Central Bank; offered a two-week banking course to Central Bank staff with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
-Provided technical assistance to the government to draft Iraq’s National Development Strategy and to establish a donor assistance coordination unit.
NEXT STEPS
-Providing technical assistance to the Iraqi Government’s budgeting process to ensure its compliance with IMF Government Financial Statistic formatting.
-Providing technical support for tax and customs administration.
-Developing a business registry for foreign and domestic companies operating in Iraq.
-Developing a sustainable and means-tested social safety net targeting poor families.
Skill Training
To support the expansion of a competitive and efficient private sector in Iraq, two USAID programs partnered with local business centers to provide thousands of Iraqis with essential business and vocational skills. The Business Skills Training program established professional skills centers throughout Iraq to provide essential and specialized business training. Over 300 grants supported small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) throughout Iraq. The Vocational Education program directly addressed unemployment, providing basic vocational and technical training to over 12,000 Iraqis.
BUSINESS SKILLS TRAINING
Volunteers for Economic Growth Alliance (VEGA), a consortium of 14 non-governmental organizations (NGOs), partnered with seven regional business centers to provide training in essential business skills. From July 2004 to December 2005, VEGA supported Iraq’s nascent private sector through training and technical assistance to business centers, start-up businesses, and executives in target industries. The VEGA program has emphasized business basics training, business plan development, and in-house mentoring as well as improvements in access to business and market information.
ACCOMPLISHMENTS
-Trained 1,400 Iraqis in business basics and over 720 in customized courses (e.g. quality control, warehouse management).
-Awarded $2,711,062 in grants to 323 small and medium-sized enterprises throughout Iraq.
-Provided training and technical assistance in areas like business planning and procurement.
-Trained and placed Iraqi business case managers in four local business service providers.
VOCATIONAL EDUCATION
From September 2004 to September 2005, the Iraq Vocational Training and Employment Services Project coordinated with the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (MOLSA) to provide basic vocational and technical training, working to rehabilitate and develop 13 Vocational Training and Technical Centers (VTTCs). The program also provided extensive training to MOLSA staff.
Curriculums were developed and handed over to VTTCs for the following courses:
Welding
Lathe work
Carpentry
Electrical functions
Auto mechanics
Tailoring
Cosmetology
Plumbing
Small appliance repair
Elevator repair
The project was suspended in September 2005 to meet the changing needs of the Iraqi Government. As development and reconstruction progressed throughout the country, the Iraqi Government saw a renewed need for Operations and Maintenance (O&M) training for government employees in essential services sectors, such as power and water.
ACCOMPLISHMENTS
-During the life of the project 12,107 Iraqis received training, 34 percent of whom were women.
-6,441 trainees have graduated from various training courses as of September 30, 2005.
-The outreach program placed 7,000 people in short-term jobs.
-Over 400 MOLSA trainers and managers received training.
Education
Assistance has helped Iraq move away from rote learning methodology in decrepit, unsanitary classrooms to interactive learning in rehabilitated buildings. Since 2003, USAID has rehabilitated nearly 3,000 schools. Over 20 million new textbooks have been supplied by USAID (8.6 million) and UNESCO (12 million). By 2006, more than 133,000 primary school teachers – a third of Iraq’s educators – will have received training and technical assistance. Already, the most recent primary school enrollment numbers show a 19 percent increase from pre-war levels.
Through the Higher Education and Development (HEAD) more than 1,500 Iraqi faculty and students have participated in workshops, trainings, conferences, and courses all over the world since January 2004. Also, HEAD has helped rehabilitate university facilities throughout the country.
REVITALIZING EDUCATION
As a result of two decades of wars and economic hardship brought on by misrule, Iraqi schools fell into disrepair, enrollment dropped, and literacy levels stagnated. Iraq’s adult literacy rate is now one
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